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Cinemas of Citizens and Cinemas of Sentiment 
Rob Stone 
 
Obviously, a rigid, blinkered, absolutist world view is the easiest 
to keep hold of, whereas the fluid, uncertain, metamorphic pic-
ture I've always carried about is rather more vulnerable.  
Salman Rushdie (1993: 23) 
 
Arguments over inclusion and exclusion flare when terms like refugee and migrant hit the headlines 
and tensions are exacerbated when nation-states change as a result of referenda, elections and con-
flict. At such times, national identity may freeze when nationalism surges or melt as treaties break 
boundaries and dilute definitions. The terms of citizenship are designed to be rigid and inviolate, 
but shifts in status can impose and withdraw this actually abstract condition, rendering it subject to 
chimerical criteria. Boxes within boxes make citizenship increasingly opaque – Scottish, British, 
European; Cuban, Caribbean, Latin American; Hong Kong, Chinese, East Asian – and the conse-
quences for world cinema are manifold. Beyond the nation-state, between the limitations of national 
cinemas and before the dispersion of transnational ones, how can the remapping of contemporary 
world cinema cope with its ongoing coagulation and dissolution? As Mette Hjort and Scott 
Mackenzie observe, “many current attempts to articulate the national or nationalist dimensions of 
cinematic cultures draw on only the most limited corpus of relevant theoretical texts. Indeed, in 
many cases it is a matter of mobilising Benedict Anderson’s modernist conception of the nation as 
an imagined community” (2000: 2). In this new attempt to encourage greater fluidity within consid-
erations of world cinema, I follow the theorising of the political scientist Georg Sørenson, who 
looks beyond the nation-state to a world made up of communities of citizens, which are defined by 
an exchange of “political, social and economic rights and obligations” (Sørenson 2004: xiv), and 
communities of sentiment, which are based on an ungovernable flow that extends via empathy to 
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include those along a strata of common or similar cultural, social, linguistic, economic conditions 
enabling “a historical identity based on literature, myths, symbols, music and art, and so on” 
(Sørenson 2004: 83). Then, by extrapolating a new theoretical framework of cinemas of citizens 
and cinemas of sentiment, I apply this to the study of world cinema in order to ameliorate its sub-
mission to what Andrew Higson called “the limiting imagination of national cinema” (2000: 63). 
Anderson theorised his imagined communities “as both inherently limited and sovereign” 
(2006: 6). They were “imagined because the members of even the smallest nation will never know 
most of their fellow-members, meet them, or even hear of them, yet in the minds of each lives the 
image of their communion” (2006: 6; emphasis in original). This was ideal for film studies because 
the imagined history and membership of a community provided synonyms for both onscreen histo-
ries of the nation and the domestic audiences of these films. Anderson’s theory of nationhood, 
which carries nationalism “as if it belonged with ‘kinship’ and ‘religion’, rather than with ‘liberal-
ism’ or ‘fascism’” (Anderson 2006: 5), is limited, however, by mapping belonging “on to a careful-
ly demarcated geo-political space” (Higson 2000: 65), one that emphasises its geographical and ge-
netic juxtaposition with other imagined communities, whose differences denote otherness. Scholars 
of world cinema focused on these “processes occurring within what is construed as a national com-
municative space” (Hjort & Mackenzie 2000: 5) as they described the cinemas of Britain (Higson 
1989, 1995; Street 1997), Spain (Stone 2001; Triana-Toribio 2003) and Japan (Standish 2006; 
Philips & Stringer 2007), amongst others, in deference to the idea that imagined communities be-
longed to “a world of sovereign states” (Schlesinger 2000: 29). Following Sørenson, however, the 
Bergsonian notion that world cinema should be understood as existing in permanent flux, which 
demands sociological enquiry into the relationships between cinema and identity in a context of po-
litical changes and cultural shifts, responds to the demand that the centrality of Anderson’s concept 
be respectfully challenged by “increased awareness, not only of the place of Anderson’s concepts 
and frameworks within the context of larger debates, but of competing accounts” (Hjort & Macken-
zie 2000: 2). 
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One of the bases of Anderson’s theory (and revisionist history of the world) was that lan-
guages could be barriers on top of borders, but that the visual, performative and creative arts never-
theless managed to communicate commonalities in “a world in which the figuring of imagined real-
ity was overwhelmingly visual and aural” (Anderson 2006: 23). This held true until capitalism rein-
stated criteria for inclusion and exclusion in relation to states and societies and “not least by its dis-
semination of print, helped to create popular, vernacular-based nationalisms in Europe” (Anderson 
2006: 39). Holding that this “figuring of imagined reality” is an evocative definition of the function 
of the cinema led to recognition that the advent of silent cinema provided a composite art that truly 
created an all-inclusive “imagined reality”, at least until languages were heard in sound film, caus-
ing evolving cinemas to restrain universal visual signifiers in favour of localised linguistic signs. 
The subsequent categorisation of these cinemas into items of coherent singularity due to their dif-
ferent languages favoured internal stratification within nations that tended to position domestic 
product as a wide range of middlebrow entertainment and pushed anything foreign to the edges via 
‘low-brow’ dubbing and ‘high-brow’ subtitling. Distributors grew adept at marketing or dismissing 
films in terms of their nationhood. Once a profitable export brand for UFA in the 1920s, German 
expressionist cinema would be rejected as un-American by competitive US distributors in the 
1930s, for example, and yet still prove itself an insidious influence on ‘un-American’ film noir. The 
relation between cinema and nation became the cornerstone of post-war European cinema and the 
studies that described it; but the recent jump from national to transnational cinemas via globalisa-
tion by means of digital technologies in relation to industry, funding and reception (Hjort 2010) has 
revived the need to understand world cinema as being formed not only by competing or colluding 
nation-states but also by ungovernable affinities made visible between communities. Like that of 
Anderson, Karl W. Deutsch’s theorisation of communication and nationalism was centred on the 
nation-state (1996: 4); but contemporary cinemas no longer have to rely upon the nation-state to be 
“still the chief political instrument for getting things done” (Deutsch 1996: 188). Indeed, as Deutsch 
foretold, “the essential aspect of the unity of a people […] is the complementarity or relative effi-
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ciency of communication among individuals – something that is in some ways similar to mutual 
rapport” (1996: 188). Deutsch delves thereafter into the idea of a people forging a nationality, 
which is distinct from nationhood, but I shall argue that this “mutual rapport” must be construed 
more pointedly as a sentiment that, following Sørenson, is capable of transcending citizenship.  
Several scholars have argued the cases for cinemas that oppose national cinemas and have 
called these accented, migrant, diasporic, peripheral, small or immigration cinemas (see Naficy 
2001; Berghahn & Sternberg 2010; Iordanova, Martin-Jones & Vidal 2010; Petrie & Hjort 2007; 
Ballesteros 2015, respectively); but a viable framework for recognising and understanding the on-
going becoming of all cinemas must include those emerging from filmmaking communities that are 
within, beyond and aligned with nation-states. The emergence and erasure of representative cine-
mas that are cognisant of their social, political, economic and aesthetic impact and their implica-
tions is a mostly organic occurrence moving through rigidification, dissolution and vaporisation in 
both directions. At one extreme appear the frozen cores of seemingly rigid, introverted, solipsistic 
and servile cinemas that are fostered by government funding and in certain regimes may be all a 
domestic audience gets to see, while at the other extreme flicker inexpensive, untethered audio-
visual items adrift on the internet. Both extremes may represent and be received by analytically ca-
pable communities, but whereas the latter may be up to the task of constantly rethinking collective 
and individual identity, the frozen kind may be less keen or able to engage in processes of reinven-
tion. Like ice, water and vapour, these mutable cinemas are essentially the same thing – just films – 
but we must update our understanding of their condition, context and function because Anderson’s 
assertion that “nation-ness is the most universally legitimate value in the political life of our time” 
(2006: 3) is simply no longer true. Also faulty therefore is the “linear notion of history that under-
stood the nation-state as the natural, not to say, organic, result of an evolutionary trajectory” (Vitali 
& Willemen 2006: 3), which follows Deutsch (1953; reprinted 1996) and Ernest Gellner (1983) in 
being “mainly concerned with how a national culture comes to be created, rather than with how it is 
maintained and renewed” (Schlesinger 2000: 21).  
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In his corrective response, Sørenson investigates maintenance and renewal by conceptualising 
a borderless world beyond the nation-state, one that combines spatial and temporal, real and virtual 
arenas of communication in which identity is less likely to be withheld, inherited or imposed than, 
as Anthony Giddens contends, it is to be “discovered, constructed, actively sustained” (Giddens 
1994: 82). In The Transformation of the State: Beyond the Myth of Retreat (2004), Sørenson assess-
es the effects of globalisation and concludes that identity is not solely determined by self-serving 
policies but by generous sentiment too. Thus he argues that modern identity exists in a condition 
and framework of flux between rigid citizenship and unrestricted sentiment, which I contend is rel-
evant to contemporary world cinema too. This flux is about more than cinema as an “adjunct of 
capitalism” (Vitali & Willemen 2006: 7) or movement between “two understandings of cinema: as 
an industry and as a cluster of cultural strategies” (Vitali & Willemen 2006: 2). When Jürgen Ha-
bermas built a theoretical framework that allowed for flux while remaining anchored to nation-
states, he described tendencies in the matter of national identity as centripetal and centrifugal forc-
es; that is to say, on the one hand he detected “a hardening of national identities as different cultural 
forms of life come into collision; on the other, the hybrid differentiations that soften native cultures 
and comparatively homogeneous forms of life in the wake of assimilation into a single material 
world culture” (Habermas 2001: 73). Sørenson theorises this as the emergence of a community of 
citizens on the one hand, and a community of sentiment on the other, but crucially moves beyond 
the nation-state in order to keep pace with fluidity and, moreover, posit this as vital to constant 
renewal. Andrew Higson formulated a similar equation when investigating the limiting imagination 
of national cinema: “At times, the experience of an organic, coherent national community, a mean-
ingful national collectivity, will be overwhelming. At other times, the experience of diaspora, dislo-
cation and de-centredness will prevail. It is at times such as these that other allegiances, other sens-
es of belonging besides the national will be more strongly felt” (Higson 2000: 65). Higson does not 
suggest what these “other senses of belonging” are, but their occurrence certainly recalls Deutsch’s 
“mutual rapport” and coincides with the fact that, as Sørenson observes, globalisation and its at-
  6 
tendant digital technology means that in the new millenium “a new system ‘beyond’ the sovereign 
state is in the making” (2004: xii),. This had already been foretold by James N. Rosenau and Ernst-
Otto Czempiel (1993), John Naisbitt (1994) and Kenichi Ohmae (1996) amongst others, with con-
sensus settling on “a transformation away from governance in the context of national government 
towards multilevel governance at overlapping national, local and international levels” (Sørenson 
2004: xiii). Crucially, however, Sørenson frames his corrective, which is both retrospective and 
prospective, as “a process of transition from modern to what I call postmodern statehood” (Søren-
son 2004: xv) in order to contend that the area between the local and the global that was previously 
dominated by nation-states is now composed of communities of citizens and communities of senti-
ment that occur within this “new context characterized by the increased salience of globalization 
and the transnational relations that go with it” (Sørenson 2004: 90). Following Sørenson, I propose 
that a new framework for understanding world cinema can be predicated upon the relations between 
cinemas of citizens and cinemas of sentiment. 
Like a community of citizens, a cinema of citizens is one based upon an exchange of “politi-
cal, social and economic rights and obligations” (Sørenson 2004: xiv). It is in the community of cit-
izens that the provision of healthcare might require payment of taxes, for example, a free or subsi-
dised education may be conditional upon subsequent military service, and clean streets and civil 
liberties will depend upon the observation of public order. Thus, a cinema of citizens will be one of 
similarly close links between government and filmmakers, which are established and maintained 
(directly and indirectly) by funding, educational strategies, investment in related infrastructure, pol-
icies, quotas, incentives like tax-breaks, sponsored training and official campaigns that support and 
exploit the soft power of homegrown films at festivals and awards ceremonies. The rights in such 
exchanges are, in a sense, rewards that reinforce similarity to other members of the community and 
a shared experience of its cinema as well as difference from those beyond it. The exchange of rights 
and obligations is subject to change, of course, but the prevailing criteria for inclusion that they es-
pouse and uphold contribute to the maintenance of a dictated or democratically determined mandate 
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for building or maintaining citizenship and cinema in a place with a shared idea and sense of itself 
as a subject with a historical, cultural and possibly linguistic identity that is legally binding, verifia-
ble by census and different from those of other communities and cinemas of citizens. Sørenson’s 
communities of citizens are different from Anderson’s imagined communities because its members 
are at least as aware of their economic-legal rights as they are of their cultural-historic obligations. 
Communities of citizens can coincide with nation-states as they congeal around a consensus of his-
torical criteria for inclusion and exclusion that flows like cement to the limits of national borders, 
although a homogenous ethno-national basis to the community is rarely viable. Correlatively, the 
cinema of citizens is perceived as having national affiliations and responsibilities although it might 
not represent the totality of its citizens, many of whom, as we shall see, may claim or pursue mem-
bership of cinemas of sentiment instead. If the exchange of rights and obligations is deemed fair, 
however, then a community and cinema of citizens is generally prone to go along with “‘banal na-
tionalism”; that is, “a collection of ideological habits (including habits of practice and belief) which 
reproduce existing nations as nations” in everyday life (Billig 1995: 6). 
In comparison, a cinema of sentiment, like a community of sentiment, is more focused on be-
coming than on being and as such offers “a dynamic picture of a contested identity always being 
debated” (Sørenson 2004: 85). Sentiment here is defined by awareness, empathy, reflection and ac-
ceptance or rejection of elements contributing to or detracting from identity and it is enacted 
through transactions that are uncontrolled by the state. A community and cinema of sentiment ex-
press themselves via a subjectivity that exceeds a legalised or politically circumscribed identity 
since such “identity formations consist of trying to ‘pin us’ to a specific, selected sub-set of the 
many diverse clusters we traverse in our lifetimes” (Willemen 2006: 30–31). This ‘pinning’ negates 
“flux, the continuity of transition” (Bergson 1992: 16), which allows a cinema of sentiment to rep-
resent an analytically competent people engaged in self-reflection. As such, the cinema of sentiment 
can represent what Manuel Castells calls a “resistance identity”, which is one that is generated by 
those actors that are “in positions/conditions devalued and/or stigmatized by the logic of domina-
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tion, thus building trenches of resistance and survival on the basis of principles different from, or 
opposed to, those permeating the institutions of society” (Castells 1998: 8). As Sørenson suggests, 
whereas the community and cinema of citizens might be said to offer “an offensive, integrating re-
sponse to globalization and other changes” that hardens the core definition of national identity at a 
certain moment, the cinema of sentiment offers “a defensive, fragmentary one” (Sørenson 2004: 93) 
that illustrates and gives voice to regional, ethnic and otherwise marginalised groups seeking a 
higher degree of autonomy. 
The cinema of sentiment is much more fragile than one of citizens. It moves outwards, seek-
ing lifelines thrown by international film festivals, smaller festivals elsewhere based on relevant 
themes or genres, such as gay cinema or documentary, and new audiences amidst the white noise of 
the internet. The cinema of sentiment can be a response to the weakening, fracture and diffusion of 
citizenship on the one hand, and to the hardening of criteria for citizenship on the other. Its potential 
for resistance may be strengthened by international funding and transnational distribution strategies 
and opportunities, which transcend the heterogeneity of localism but may also encourage resistance 
to the homogeneity of globalization. Here, perhaps, as Hjort suggests, the aim is primarily commu-
nication between a number of cultures whose empathy may be “understood in terms of ethnicity, 
partially overlapping or mutually intelligible languages, and a history of interaction giving rise to 
shared core values, common practices, and comparable institutions” (2010: 17). The sentiment of 
something shared, which might be regionalism, marginalisation of many kinds, economic sedimen-
tation or much else besides, gives rise to a project of identity construction that suggests and may 
even realise a collective identity above and beyond the communities of citizens from which it 
emerges. In some cases, such as that in which cinemas of sentiment colluded to invent a nationalist 
African cinema tradition in the years between 1960 and 1975, such cinemas reveal ambitions to be a 
synecdoche for an otherwise lacking cinema of citizens in retrospective analysis that “comes on the 
heels of a moribund national construction discourse, after scores of national governments in Africa 
failed to provide for their citizenry” (Niang 2014: xii). In other cases, potential cinemas of senti-
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ment, such as those emerging from the White and Black American lower classes in the United 
States, may fail to cohere because their commonalities are erased in the dominant Hollywood cine-
ma, which is arguably tantamount to a cinema of citizens, which caters to aspirational Whites while 
largely erasing Blacks, as the 2016 uproar over #OscarsSoWhite suggested (Ryan 2016). 
Willemen touches on that fact that citizenship is what is currently objectively correct, but sen-
timent is what is felt to be most relevant, when he notes that “the concern with socio-cultural speci-
ficity is different from identity searches and debates” (Willemen 2006: 34). Concern with citizen-
ship tends to look backwards and inwards to a defining core that risks hardening, whereas sentiment 
tends to look forwards and outwards to possible new configurations and risks dissolution. Flux is 
evident because sentiment can be patriotic or nationalist too, of course, for an emotional attachment 
to the nation can be fierce. Indeed, when subscription to the beliefs maintained in a narrow, nation-
alist selection of “literature, myths, symbols, music and art, and so on” (Sørenson 2004: 83) upholds 
a socio-cultural criteria for inclusion and exclusion that is inscribed as legal criteria, the community 
of sentiment will become one of citizens. At the same time, cinemas of sentiment may compete 
with those of citizens by highlighting diversity at home and transnational connections abroad, 
whereby social media and digital communication also clarify the economic sedimentation of people 
the world over as a result of globalised neo-liberalism. This means that the horizontal affinities 
sought by communities of sentiment and manifested in their cinemas will tend to exhibit financially 
determined similarities in terms of production values, form and aesthetics, which currently result 
from accessible new digital technologies, multi-platform virtual environment, skill with inexpensive 
filmmaking equipment, online distribution and file-sharing that enable contact between those keen 
on making and watching certain types of film.  
Such affinities are evident in the economic sedimentation of types of film production and the 
aesthetics of impoverishment shared by the American Mumblecore and the Romanian New Wave, 
for example. Mumblecore is a contested term that denotes a zero-budget cluster of films that 
emerged from the American indie scene in the 2000s in order to adequately represent educated but 
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dislocated twenty-somethings, while the Romanian New Wave, which is another contested catego-
risation, also emerged in the 2000s to describe those filmmakers who responded to the lack of a vi-
able Romanian cinema of citizens by creating one of sentiment. The dissent over categorisation is 
itself suggestive of flux, because, as Marina Kaceanov explains of Romanian cinema, “after the 
troubled years of transformations, socio-economical problems, and constant battles with the bureau-
cracy of the National Centre for Cinematography, the growing conflict between past and present 
finally exploded into a cultural revolution. The present requires its own chroniclers, and the young-
er and more in touch they are with reality, the better. When there is no room, funding or support for 
younger people, an opposition is born” (Kaceanov 2008). The limitations of the filmmaking appa-
ratus in both these cinemas of sentiment reveal numerous commonalities; not only the relatively 
cheap technology employed in their making but the resulting minimalism, long scenes of natural-
istic dialogue alternating with introspective patches of silence, the use of subtle camera movement 
to represent negotiation and power-play between characters, a focus on the personal relationships of 
young adults that favours female subjectivity and, ultimately, a tone of lived-in resignation shared 
by the likes of Marnie (Kate Dollenmayer) in Funny Ha Ha (Andrew Bujalski, 2002) and Otilia 
(Anamaria Marinca) in 4 luni, 3 săptămâni și 2 zile (4 Months, 3 Weeks, 2 Days, Cristian Mungiu, 
2007). Both Mumblecore and the Romanian New Wave outlived the comparatively brief life expec-
tancy of cinemas of sentiment. Repetition and conformity rendered Mumblecore increasingly re-
dundant and prompted its migration to television in series such as Togetherness (Jay & Mark Du-
plass, 2015–16), Love (Judd Apatow, 2016–) and Easy (Joe Swanberg, 2016–). And when sustained 
international festival success for Romanian cinema resembled “less a new wave than a persistent 
surf-pounding” (Zeitchik 2016), it drew criticism that Romanian filmmakers were second-guessing 
the sympathies of international juries: “How much to continue in a style that’s served it well but 
could grow stale, like all styles, is an open question, as is the challenge of keeping on in a nation 
where even leaders admit they've failed their filmmakers” (Zeitlich 2016). On the other hand, the 
persistence of Romanian filmmakers may have prompted their standing as an auteurist elite that so 
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‘branded’ Romanian cinema it may have obviated a Romanian cinema of citizens and precluded 
other Romanian cinemas of sentiment from emerging. 
Clearly communities and cinemas of citizens and sentiment have the capacity to morph into 
each other and this is key to the context of flux that they inhabit. A community of citizens that ab-
sorbs an unlimited number of immigrants, cedes the provision of rights to a supranational body such 
as the European Union or United Nations, fragments into regions with claims on autonomy, enters 
into associations with other territories and/or populations that override internal policy, dilutes the 
legal criteria for inclusion and invests in cultural partnerships with others that erase differences be-
tween them may give rise to a community or communities of sentiment. At the same time, the hard-
ening of criteria for inclusion can lead to exclusions within the community and cinema of citizens 
as some members are re-classified and lose their rights because of new laws and governments or 
referenda. The results and ramifications of the UK’s 2016 referendum on whether it should leave or 
remain in the European Union provide a pertinent example of this. Many voters clearly felt that 
their ‘British’ community of citizens, which was shown be mainly English, had been superseded by 
a European community of citizens and so campaigned for a nationalistic ‘British’ community of 
sentiment that the result of the referendum would convert into a new community of citizens by 
means of reinstating sovereignty and protectionist immigration policies. The community of citizens 
is potentially transformative, but tends to resemble or reassemble as a rigid “historical structure” 
(Cox 1994) resembling the nation-state when its ambitions are informed by conservatism that ex-
humes the values of the past. At the same time, however, many other voters felt themselves 
wrenched from a European community of citizens and alienated from the nationalistic ‘British’ 
community of sentiment and the community of citizens that it would become, and, following the 
result, they subsequently clung to and campaigned for membership of a European community of 
sentiment. In relation to such changes, one might eventually in retrospect be able to recognise cin-
emas of citizens and of sentiment. A British cinema of citizens will tend towards thematic and ge-
neric limitations and favour telling stories that serve soft power policies and repay funding with a 
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flattering view of the community of citizens that watches them, as well as by occasional foreign au-
diences who enjoy the exoticism of such ‘English’ things as Edwardian etiquette in Thatcher-era 
films like Room with a View (James Ivory, 1985) or the prurience of the 1950s in Dance with a 
Stranger (Mike Newell, 1985), which were both co-produced by the National Film Finance Corpo-
ration. If, in such situations, filmmakers move away from the traditional themes or genres of a state-
centric cinema of citizens they may struggle to obtain funding, which abets ignorance of the “ac-
cented cinema” of immigrants and disenfranchised minorities (Naficy 2001) as well as the inde-
pendent, online and underground films associated with Welsh, Scottish, regional, Black British and 
queer British cinemas of sentiment and much else besides.  
Moreover, although nationhood remains a strong context, cinemas of sentiment may gain 
strength and also demand rights and changes to the criteria for exclusion and inclusion that deter-
mines funding for films, as happens in Spain, where the Catalan-language cinema of sentiment, for 
example, represents an alternative socio-political context of increasing autonomy for the region of 
Catalonia and produces what many separatists hope might turn into a Catalan cinema of citizens. 
Fractures in the close links between citizenship and sentiment are particularly evident when a new 
system above the national, such as the European Union, emerges. In such instances, “with the 
growth of supranational cooperation, an institutional level ‘above’ the nation-state […] can become 
a new partner for the regional movements” (Sørenson 2004: 94). This allows regions within nation-
states to appeal legally and emotively to entities beyond them, as with the Basque Country’s appeal 
to Europe during the Francoist dictatorship (Arrieta Alberdi 2015: 77–83), which carried with it the 
idea that a Basque cinema of sentiment might become part of a European cinema of sentiment or 
even of citizens as opposed to the Spanish cinema of citizens that then enclosed it. Cinemas of sen-
timent illustrate Yasemin Nuhoglu Soysal’s argument that citizenship may be transformed “from a 
more particularistic one based on nationhood to a more universalistic one based on personhood” 
(Soysal 1994: 137), which may lessen links between individuals and their communities of citizens 
by enabling global movements of ethnic, political and social identification and protest too. Individ-
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ual filmmakers who encounter exclusion in communities and cinemas of citizens for political or re-
ligious beliefs, sexuality or ethnicity, for example, may well find inclusion in a community and cin-
ema of sentiment made up of similar and empathetic individuals. 
Clearly it is possible to belong to both a community of citizens and a community of sentiment 
or indeed several at the same time, although the risk of plunging into contradiction and paradox in-
creases. The relationship between cinemas of citizens and sentiment does not have to be conflictive, 
however. There is often ample space in developed, outward-looking communities of citizens for its 
centripetal cinema of citizens and various centrifugal cinemas of sentiment to co-exist, but if there 
is competition for resources and the state does not deliver on political, legal and social rights then 
questions of legitimacy arise and there may even be a switching point at which the revolutionary 
cinema of sentiment becomes one of citizens and the previous cinema of citizens finds itself redun-
dant or redefined as one of probably resentful sentiment. Both cinemas of citizens and of sentiment 
may give rise to a filmmaking elite, although the critical emphasis on auteurism will probably fa-
vour the independence of the latter. In addition, governments may maintain funding for an artificial-
ly self-sufficient cinema of citizens offering more hagiographic representations of the nation than 
the multifarious films emerging from cinemas of sentiment. A cinema of citizens may also seek to 
absorb diversity when intending for this to become a marker of its identity, such as when Oscars go 
conspicuously to American films about strong gay, Black or female characters, or when New Zea-
land cinema is represented by films about Maori culture such as the realist Once Were Warriors 
(Lee Tamahori, 1994) and the mythic Whale Rider (Niki Caro, 2002). Then again, if a community 
of citizens encounters and displays weakness on an economic, political or cultural level, it might not 
be able to deliver the rights of citizenship, causing fragmentation into potentially ungovernable eth-
nic, tribal, religious or political loyalties and giving rise to cinemas of sentiment that move beyond 
ideological centring. And if there is little or no funding for a cinema of citizens within a community 
of citizens and hardly any domestic or foreign audience for films either, then only fleeting and pos-
sibly extremist cinemas of sentiment will be made by ambitious interest groups and individuals.  
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Crucially, whereas the community of citizens tends to define identity from above and impose 
it top-down, the community of sentiment creates it from below. The cinema of citizens is introvert-
ed when at its most patriotic or nationalistic, but the cinema of sentiment is extrovert by nature, 
seeking connections with the like-minded and reciprocally empathetic, which means it thrives on 
the internet. Another vital distinction is that the community of citizens is incapable of conceiving of 
itself as Other, whereas this is an essential trait of the community of sentiment because empathy is 
how it looks and reaches beyond itself to “discover the reference points of collective identity” 
(Sørenson 2004: 91). The cinemas of citizens and of sentiment are not mutually exclusive, however, 
and can twist together like a two-colour spiral when a minority language cinema like that in Basque 
or Welsh, for example, is held to be as much of a cinema of citizens as a cinema of sentiment. This 
spiralling also happens when a cinema that is critical of the community of citizens that birthed it is 
taken to be representative of it too. The films directed by fifth-generation Chinese filmmakers, such 
as Da hong deng long gao gao gua (Raise The Red Lantern, Zhang Yimou, 1991) and Ba wang bie 
ji (Farewell My Concubine, Chen Kaige, 1993), for example, questioned the totalitarian nationalism 
of the People’s Republic of China although they were officially funded and (mostly) passed by the 
Chinese censors because they were period films that included characters who espoused Communist 
dogma and thus formally represented a Chinese cinema of citizens. It was largely the international 
acclaim that celebrated their visual riches and subtle cultural critiques that revealed them as contra-
dictory, even paradoxical, and therefore evidence of a cinema of sentiment. Similarly, in Spain un-
der Franco (1939–75), the cine metafórico (metaphorical cinema) represented by the likes of La 
muerte de un ciclista (Death of a Cyclist, Juan Antonio Bardem, 1955) and La caza (The Hunt, Car-
los Saura, 1966) demonstrated dissident, even communist sympathies that smuggled criticism of the 
dictatorship into international festivals and constituted a cinema of sentiment met by tolerance in 
Spain. This was partly because the ecclesiastical censor failed to decipher the metaphorical narra-
tives and partly because the regime, seeking foreign investment, could point to such critical films as 
evidence of a cinema of citizens indicating a tolerant and open society, all the while knowing that 
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these films would be barely distributed in Spain and unpopular with Spanish audiences anyway. 
The post-Franco removal of censorship prompted the emergence of several cinemas of sentiment 
from regions with claims on autonomy as well as waves of queer, underground and, in time, immi-
grant cinema too, with the Basque cinema of sentiment actually becoming a cinema of citizens 
when the nation-building policies of the newly autonomous Basque government saw 5% of its en-
tire budget dedicated to developing a domestic film industry (Stone & Rodríguez 2015). Similarly, 
the variety of cinemas that currently represent regions in the Middle East such as the Arabian Pen-
insula, the Nile Valley, Maghreb, Palestine and the occupied territory of the West Bank as well as 
cities like Cairo, Beirut, and Dubai all make claims to be cinemas of sentiment and may have ambi-
tions to be cinemas of citizens.  
Aiming to restore flux to considerations of world cinema, not simply as moments of change 
but as an ongoing, eternal becoming, this chapter answers Philip Schlesinger’s call for “an explana-
tory grasp of the increasingly evident contradictions between the various levels of culture and iden-
tity that are tending to decouple state and nation” (2000: 30). This new framework of cinemas of 
citizens and of sentiment thus challenges the long-standing paradigm of eight concepts of national 
cinemas elaborated by Stephen Crofts (1998), who writes from an occidental view of world cinema 
as a collection of “nation-state cinemas” (1998: 390). Crofts thus prioritises “United States cinema” 
(1998: 390), which retains no such privilege in this new framework. He then proceeds to map world 
cinema from a single-point perspective, noting the autonomy of large Indian and Hong Kong cine-
mas that “can afford to ignore Hollywood” (1998: 390), for example, and ignoring the unruly net-
work of cinemas of sentiment that exist in the shadow of such monoliths as well as the ongoing 
need for the de-westernization of film theory championed by Ba and Higbee (2012). Furthermore, 
Crofts takes ‘Indian’ to be synonymous with the Mumbai-based, Hindi-language Bollywood, which 
means that the Bengali-language Bangladeshi cinema known as Dhallywood is dismissed as an imi-
tation of what is ‘Indian’ cinema, thereby failing to recognise the cinema of sentiment that such ap-
parently imitative but profoundly ambitious practices in Bangladeshi cinema represent. His similar 
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stratifications of ‘African’ cinema spoil the study of what should be approached as a plethora of 
cinemas of citizens and cinemas of sentiment too. Indeed, describing Australian and Canadian cin-
emas as “imitations of US cinema” (1998: 390) promotes another hierarchical categorisation that 
fails to accommodate cinemas of sentiment within both (such as Aboriginal and Canadian French-
language cinema) or realise how imitation can shape citizenship and be a vehicle of sentiment too. 
His description of “totalitarian cinemas” (1998: 390) corresponds to cinemas of citizens, but his 
idea of “sub-state cinemas” that are defined “ethnically in terms of suppressed, indigenous, diaspor-
ic, or other populations asserting their civil rights and giving expression to a distinctive religion, 
language or regional culture” (1988: 390) does not allow for the transnational nature of many cine-
mas of sentiment, which may thrive beyond the nation-state. His erroneous categorisation of “Third 
cinema” as something separate, moreover, does not foresee that such cinemas of sentiment, alt-
hough oppositional and anti-capitalist, can in time become those of citizens if their values rigidify, 
thereby inspiring a new cinema of sentiment to rise up and challenge it. This happened in Cuba, for 
example, where post-revolutionary cinema aspired to be a Third cinema but became institutional-
ised, prompting challenges by new filmmakers who operated beyond the control of the Cuban 
community of citizens thanks to cheap digital equipment and alternative means of dissemination 
(Stone & Fehimović 2015). Finally, Crofts’ broad assertion that “art cinemas vary somewhat in the 
sourcing of their finances and in their textual characteristics” (1998: 390) lacks a nuanced under-
standing of how subscription to a collective sentiment or servility to the hegemonic values that de-
fine citizenship can determine criteria for funding and be revealed in a film’s aesthetics.  
Rather than frameworks that cannot keep pace with technological innovation, political 
change, the movement of people and the networks they inhabit, the concept of cinemas of citizens 
and of sentiment embraces the present continuous tense of world cinema and maps its real-time on-
going evolution. This mutable framework removes the limitations of thinking in terms of national 
cinemas and, indeed, “a narcissistic, self-reflexive and self-fulfilling view of national cinemas” 
(Hayward 2000: 92). It also does away with stateless, accented, interstitial and non-cinemas, which 
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are too fixed in their criteria, in favour of flux between cinemas of citizens or of sentiment. It rec-
ognises that a context of increasing rupture between cinema and nation allows for the transfer of 
social values between the cinema of citizens to a cinema of sentiment and, vice versa, it reacts to 
new consolidations of citizenship and even nationhood by tracking the evolution of cinemas of sen-
timent into those of citizens. Unlike strict categorisations of films, filmmakers and cinemas, this 
framework is defined by its flexibility, which includes and even emphasises overlap and coinci-
dence. The cinema of citizens is intended to strengthen the link between the community and its citi-
zens, whereas the cinema of sentiment may weaken it, while strengthening that between people and 
other people. Taken together, but also apart, cinemas of citizens and cinemas of sentiment illustrate 
that belonging is both a legal and an emotional quality, which may not coincide, but which reveal in 
their own way how world cinema is held together and sometimes falls apart. 
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